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Every Inch a King?
By Gerhard Casper*
I am grateful to the Committee for providing
me with this opportunity to testify on the im-
portant subject which is the concern of the Com-
mittee. I shall discuss the emergency powers of
the executive, first by analyzing the constitutional
framework, and then by raising some even larger
historical and political questions.
L
While the constitutions of other democracies,
for instance France and Germany, include more
or less elaborate rules for institutional adjust-
ments to be made during emergencies (like trans-
fer of legislative powers to the executive or a
parliamentary committee), the United States
Constitution does not provide for suspending
the basic and ordinary distribution and separa-
tion of powers in times of emergency. This is
not to say that the Constitution is void of any
rules for extraordinary situations, but rather that
these rules are narrow in scope.
In view of the attitudes prevailing at the Con-
stitutional Convention, it should come as no sur.
prise that no drastic structural changes for coping
with national emergencies were contemplated.
To confer upon the President extraordinary con-
stitutional authority to deal independently with
emergencies, would have only further heightened
the widespread fear that the Presidency might
be turned into a temporary monarchy or might
fall into the hands of a Cataline or Cromwell,
*This paper Is based upon the statement by Gerhard Casper.
Professor of Law and Political Science, The University of Chi.
cago, before the United States Senate's Special Committee on
The Termination of the National Emergency, April I, 1973.
3
and would have jeopardized its adoption. As
Franklin said when speaking against an absolute
negative for the executive: "The first man put
at the helm will be a good one. Nobody knows
what sort may come afterwards. The executive
will always be increasing here, till it ends in a
Monarchy." [Madison, Notes of Debates in the
Federal Convention of 1787, 66 (Norton Library
1969)]. Corwin's assertion that "the Presidency
was designed in great measure to reproduce the
monarchy of George III with the corruption left
out," can claim to be no more than a clever re-
sponse to Sir Henry Maine's dictum, that "the
American constitution is the British constitution
with the monarchy left out." [Corwin, The Pres-
ident: Office and Powers 14, 4th ed. (1957)].
As concerns the most dangerous of all emer-
gencies: war, the Constitutional Convention
gave the executive the power to repel sudden
attacks but left declarations of war to Congress.
[Madison, supra at 476]. The problem with the
war powers of the Confederation, after all, had
not been the fact that they were vested in the
Continental Congress, but that they were insuffi-
cient vis-a-vis the states. In addition to the quota
system of financial contributions, the Confedera-
tion depended on quota requisitions of man-
power. These were the deficiencies the new
constitution was primarily designed to resolve.
Otherwise, we do well to remember that the War
of Independence was carried to its successful end
by the Congress itself. [On the prevailing views
about the weaknesses of the Confederation, cf.
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic
1776-1787, 471ff (1969)].
On the same day on which the Convention
discussed the war power, August 16, 1787, it
also dealt with the internal emergency of re-
bellions within a state. Governeur Morris, other-
wise a friend of a strong executive, argued against
hampering the general government by not per-
mitting it to intervene without application by a
state legislature: "We are acting a very strange
part. We first form a strong man to protect us,
and at the same time wish to tie his hands be-
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hind him. The legislature may surely be trusted
with such a power to preserve the public tran-
quility." [Madison, supra at 475]. In context,
"strong man" meant the general government
and "legislature" the national legislature.
Given the fact that the United States Consti-
tution has been interpreted by almost all an-
alysts, American and foreign, as an extremely
carefully engineered document, characterized by
a sustained sombreness of mood, anticipating
"little good, but mainly evil: war, universal
corruption, public insolence and insubordina-
tion," Uacobson, Political Science and Political
Education, 57 The American Political Science
Review 561, 562 (1963)] the refusal to arrange
for institutional changes during emergencies ex-
presses the confidence of the Founding Fathers
that the ordinary institutions were so designed
as to be capable of coping with extraordinary
events. After all, their system of government, as
The Federalist amply demonstrates, was based on
the "scientific" insight that "power controled or
abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of
that power by which it is controled or abridged."
[Hamilton, Federalist No. 15]. Checks were
heaped upon checks so that the love for power
could be harnessed.' In the decade following the
War of Independence, distrust of power seems
to have been the most widespread sentiment
among Americans.
What are those constitutional provisions which
may be considered to have a bearing on the
question of emergency powers? Article I Section
8 gives the Congress the power
To declare War ... ;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropri-
ation of Money to that use shall be for a longer
term than two years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to exe-
cute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disci-
plining the Militia...
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Section 9 of the same Article prohibits suspen-
sion of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
"unless when in Case of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."
Unless the grant of the executive power per se
is seen as giving the President emergency powers,
a queer interpretation in light of the Conven-
tion's detailed delegation of powers and especially
in light of the "necessary and proper clause,"
Article II which deals with the Presidency has
only two relevant provisions.* Section 2 makes
the President "Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States and of the Militia
of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States." Section 3 em-
powers the President to convene both Houses
or either of them "on extraordinary occasions."
Finally, Section 4 of Article IV, the article
which regulates certain aspects of federalism,
provides:
The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against do-
mestic Violence.
*Almost all the considerable substantive powers of the modern
presidency have been conferred upon that office by Congressional
legislation. The Constitution itself carefully enumerates (and
thus limits) Presidential powers. An analysis of the Constitution
yields something like the following list.
I. Legislative process
(1) "power" (duty) to Inform the Congress about the state
of the union and to make recommendations;
(2) power to convene both Houses of Congress, or either of
them, on extraordinary occasions;
(3) power to adjourn Congress In case of disagreement
between the Houses:
(4) Veto power:
(5) "power" (duty) to execute the laws (this Includes dele-
gated rule-making powers).
II. "Foreign Affairs" powers
(1) power to make treaties by and with the consent and
advice of two-thirds of the Senate;
(2) power to receive envoys;
(3) power to appoint envoys, subject to Senate confirmation.
III. Power as Commander-In-Chief, including the power to re-
pel sudden attacks on the United States or its armed forces.
IV. Sundry powers
(1) power to receive advice from department heads;
(2) power of pardon;
(3) power of appointments, subject to constraints listed in
Article II, Section 2.
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Beyond these specific provisions, Congress may,
of course, in the exercise of its power to make all
necessary and proper laws for executing powers
vested in the Government of the United States,
authorize the President to take certain measures
in specified emergencies. Since the Constitution
nowhere gives the President either the power to
declare a national emergency or to legislate in-
dependently of Congress, such declarations must
generally be based on Congressional delegation,
subject to the restrictions which limit delegation
of powers.
The only exception to this rule involves the
President's power to repel sudden attacks on the
United States (and its armed forces stationed
abroad) which surely includes the power to take
emergency action. But since the ultimate war
power is in the hands of the Congress, the scope
of the President's power in this area is uncertain:
it falls into what Justice Jackson has called "a
zone of twilight." [Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 348 U.S. 579, 687 (Jackson concur-
ring) (1952)]. Not as a matter of constitutional
law, but as a factual matter, public confusion
about the borders of this zone has been con-
siderably increased due to the inertia of Congress
with respect to the Korean and Vietnam enter-
prises.
What is reasonably clear, however, is that the
President's portion of the so-called "foreign af-
fairs power" does not give him any special emer-
gency power outside the framework of Congres-
sional delegation. It is important to remember
that foreign affairs is not an exclusive domain
of the President. More importantly, power over
foreign affairs does not give the President added
power over internal, including economic affairs.
[343 U.S. 579, 644]. United States v. Curtiss-
Wright is not a case to the contrary, since the
Court limited it to its facts which involved "a
situation entirely external to the United States."
[United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936)]. Justice Sutherland's
extravagant dicta in that case about "the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the Pres-
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ident as the sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations" [299 U.S.
304, 320] are irrelevant, precisely because they
are dicta. The President in that case had acted
in accordance with a very specific and narrow
Joint Resolution of Congress which would meet
anybody's standards for delegation of powers.
There must be grave doubts, for example,
about the constitutionality of the surcharge im-
posed by President Nixon on August 15, 1971
and apparently justified by his declaration of a
national emergency, since in that situation statu-
tory authority was insufficient. [Pres. Proclama-
tion No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971)]. The
President has no constitutional authority to en-
gage in regulation of the economy by mere in-
cantation of the word "emergency." [Comment,
The United States Response to Common Market
Trade Preferences and the Legality of the Im-
port Surcharge, 39 The University of Chicago
Law Review 177, 234 (1971)]. Here, as elsewhere,
the Congress, of course, bears responsibility. Since
it generally applauded the measures of August 15,
1971, it apparently considered itself relieved of
institutional constraints. In the end, the Con-
gress neither ratified nor removed the surcharge.
The President did so when he thought it had
accomplished its goal.
Whatever emergency powers are to be given
the President by the Congress ought to be cir-
cumscribed as to the specific circumstances in
which they may be invoked, must include stand-
ards for their exercise and must, in any event,
never amount to transfer of legislative powers to
the executive or to abdication on the part of the
Congress. [Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935)]. This principle
does not exclude delegation of somewhat broader
rule-making powers for and during emergencies
than would be permitted under delegation of
powers standards for ordinary times. As Justice
Jackson wrote in the Steel Seizure Cases:
In the practical working of Government, we
already have evolved a technique within the
framework of the Constitution by which nor-
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mal executive powers may be considerably ex-
panded to meet an emergency. Congress may
and has granted extraordinary authorities
which lie dormant in normal times but may
be called into play by the Executive in war or
upon proclamation of a national emergency.
[343 U.S. 579, 652].
The most important conclusion to follow from
the prohibition of transfer of legislative powers
and abdication is that it is generally the obliga-
tion of Congress to determine when an emergency
begins and when it ends. While fixing the be-
ginning may be very difficult since abstract lan-
guage has to be used to define future events never
exactly foreseeable, determination of the end of
an emergency is considerably less difficult since
the Congress will have or should have all the
necessary information.
The point of the matter is that it would be
unrealistic not to view rule-making powers of
the President during emergencies as essentially
legislative in nature. Delegation under these cir-
cumstances will give the President not just dis-
cretion as to details, but often will be open-ended
as to content and scope of the authorization. To
make this state of affairs constitutionally proper,
it has to be put under severe constraints in terms
of Congressional oversight and termination. If
this argument has any power, those laws presently
on the books must be considered unconstitutional
which give the executive extraordinary powers
without providing for termination of a Presiden-
tially invoked emergency. They constitute an
unchecked transfer of legislative powers.
It does not take any particular legal sensitivity
to find it shocking that as late as 1970, a United
States Court of Appeals upheld the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations on the authority of the
Korean Emergency. [Nielsen v. Secretary of the
Treasury, 424 F.2d 833 (1970). See also Sardino
v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d
106 (1966)]. How can the Congress expect a cit-
izen to abide by principles of law and order, if
he is called upon to obey regulations which by
no stretch of the imagination can be related to
the state of affairs which allegedly justifies them.
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This surrealistic nightmare (has the Great De-
pression emergency ended?) is also extremely bad
politics, since the only way a citizen can be ex-
pected to cope with appeals for extraordinary
sacrifices which are normally associated with
emergency proclamations is not to take them too
seriously. Public rhetoric suffers anyway from
inflation.
Constitutional and orderly lawmaking calls
for no less than restricting to an absolute min-
imum those laws which confer emergency powers
on the President. But more importantly, it is
mandatory for the Congress to provide regular
review for all emergencies which have been in-
voked. To force the Congress to do so, no emer-
gency authority should be permitted to continue
beyond a fixed time span (for instance, six
months), unless re-enacted by the Congress. A
principle which would continue an emergency
unless ended by the Congress after mandatory
review will probably not do constitutionally, be-
cause our experience with the inertia of Congress
has shown Congressional veto to be futile as well
as unconstitutional. Inaction on the part of the
Congress can be as unconstitutional as action.
In short, it is not only the legislative prerogative
of the Congress, but it is its duty tightly to con-
trol emergencies. Otherwise, this could truly be-
come a "garrison state."
Challenged to define "emergency" one feels in-
clined to answer: "An emergency is an emergency,
is an emergency.. ." To define emergencies in dic-
tionary terms ("an unforeseen combination of cir-
cumstances or the resulting state that calls for
immediate action") is not exactly helpful either.
Attempts to give meaning to the concept of emer-
gency by providing examples (war, insurrection)
simply tend to shift the definitional burden.
These conceptual difficulties point to the nature
of the problem: whether a state of affairs may
be designated an emergency and thus bring ex-
traordinary powers of government into play, is
a question of context evaluation and judgment.
Under the American system of government, judg-
ments of this nature, i.e., judgments with far-
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reaching consequences for rights and obligations,
are committed to the Congress. I am therefore
of the opinion that the President alone cannot-
as a rule and with the previously noted excep.
tion of his right to repel sudden attacks-declare
a state of emergency. There may be extremely
rare situations where the President may consider
it his responsibility to invoke emergency powers
and only subsequently ask the Congress for rati-
fication. One should perhaps conceptualize such
emergencies as "extraordinary" even by compar-
ison with other emergencies. For instance, I do
not believe that the so-called "balance of pay-
ments" emergency was of such a nature.
Congressional emergency legislation, as I en-
visage it, falls into three different categories. (1)
Substantive legislation: this is legislation of the
type which says, that in case of a Congressionally
declared emergency the President may do such
and such. Present legislation and future pro-
posals of this nature should be carefully reviewed
for their constitutionality in terms of delegation
of powers and restrictions of individual rights.
(2) The second category I shall call, for lack of a
better term, "invocation" legislation: Congress,
through legislation or joint resolution, in a
specific instance invokes emergency powers. Invo-
cation legislation would list in detail those stat-
utes which the emergency brings into operation.
(5) The last category I shall call "framework"
legislation: this is legislation of the type con-
templated by the Special Committee. It spells
out that "invocation" is principally a function
of Congress. It would require that in the rare
situations where the President has the authority
to declare an emergency, he has to seek Con-
gressional ratification (within 30 or 60 days). It
would further provide that a state of emergency
must not last longer than six months unless re-
newed by the Congress.
Given the highly technical nature of law and
its language, comparison to laws of foreign na-
11
tions is perhaps the most inexact of all social
sciences. The opportunities for error due to
failure to appreciate fully foreign legal intri-
cacies and political traditions are virtually end-
less. Nevertheless, some comparison with emer-
gency powers under the Weimar Constitution
may be in order. I do not offer this comparison
in order to argue that Weimar ended in a dic-
tatorship because of excessive Presidential emer-
gency powers. It would be foolish to make that
argument, for such argument must disregard
too many other explanatory variables, though I
hasten to say that some causal relationship did
exist. Instead, I indulge such comparison only
with reference to the relatively narrow point
about legislative passivity that I just made. Un-
der Art. 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the
President had the authority to take emergency
measures when public safety and order were en-
dangered. What Constitutional lawyers of the
Weimar era called with admirable frankness,
"the dictatorial powers" of the President, were
invoked approximately 136 times between 1919
and 1925. Due to the improvement of economic
and political conditions in the mid-1920s, the
authority was not utilized for about five years.
Beginning in July 1930 and through March 1932,
another 61 Presidential orders were promulgated
under Art. 48. [The figures are taken from An-
schiitz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches
279-80 (1933)]. As a safeguard, that Article re-
quired the President to report all such measures
without delay to the Reichstag and to repeal
them if the Reichstag so demanded. Between
1919 and 1932, this happened exactly three times.
(Anschittz, supra at 294]. Parliament was much
too confused, split, and passive to counter vig-
orous Presidents who claimed to act according
to the mandate they held on account of popular
election. Furthermore, as Holborn has argued,
the use of Art. 48 encouraged the political par-
ties "to believe that they could shun unpleasant
legislative responsibilities, because there existed
another power capable of sustaining the govern-
ment." (Holborn, A History of Modern Germany
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1840-1945, 546 (1969)). One should add that in
the end, the "other power" also proved itself to
be capable of delivering the republic into the
hands of its enemy.
If anything is to be learned from American
history, and from foreign experience, it is, of
course, that no amount of constitutional law
will help unless the Congress pulls itself together
and jealously and responsibly guards its legis-
lative prerogative. Again, this point has been
made most persuasively by Mr. Justice Jackson
in his Steel Seizure concurrence:
But I have no illusion that any decision by
this Court can keep power in the hands of
Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting
its problems. A crisis that challenges the Presi-
dent equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges
Congress. If not good law, there was wordly
wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon
that "The tools belong to the man who can
use them." We may say that power to legis-
late for emergencies belongs in the hands of
Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent
power from slipping through its fingers. [343
U.S. 579, 654].
Unfortunately, Jackson's pessimism has proved
to be amply justified in the few years which have
passed since the only major Supreme Court de-
cision on the subject matter.
I turn to somewhat more speculative matters.
It is, of course, often argued that Congress cannot
wield emergency tools because it is institutionally
incapable of doing so. This argument comes in
two varieties: an absolute one, and a relative
one. The absolute version is clearly not war-
ranted in light of the constitutional history of
the country. In addition to the above mentioned
example of the War of Independence, we would
do well to remember that following Lincoln's
assassination, almost the entire burden of dealing
with emergency conditions prevailing after the
Civil War fell on the Congress. Congress, in par-
ticular through the emergency Reconstruction
Acts of March 1867, by and large acquitted itself
rather admirably. Professor Fairman, one of our
leading constitutional historians on the period,
has recently summarized the immensely difficult
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situation with which the Congress was faced in
the following words:
Congress must reckon with a President who
had met every critical measure with a veto, and
who, while adhering to his duty to enforce the
statutes, would yet give them the narrowest
construction. The Court had not placed its
authority behind the statutes: indeed it was
widely believed to stand ready to condemn the
entire effort. State officers were not merely
evading federal laws by subterfuge: at critical
junctures they proclaimed them to be uncon-
stitutional and refused obedience. What Con-
gress did in the prosecution of its effort to re-
store the Union on the basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment is entitled to a far more discrim-
inating consideration than it has generally re-
ceived. [Fairman, History of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Reconstruction
and Reunion, 1864-8B, Part One 342-43 (1971)].
It goes without saying that there are many le-
gitimate criticisms of what the Congress did and
did not do during Reconstruction. Yet, anybody
familiar with the details of Reconstruction pol-
itics must at least admit that the Congress did
better than President Johnson. And what greater
emergency than the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion with their tremendous dissension, dislo-
cations and racial problems, has the United States
seen? Though perhaps larger in operational
scope, World Wars I and II seem to pale by com-
parison because in those instances the country
was more or less united. The last example of
"a house divided," the Vietnam War, is no glow-
ing testimony to the inherent capacity of the
Presidency effectively to resolve emergencies.
The relative variety of the incapacity argument
does not deny that the Congress may have been
capable of dealing with emergencies in an earlier
age when everything, including emergencies, sup.
posedly happened at a slower pace and matters
could be resolved with less of a bureaucratic in-
frastructure. It holds that the world has become
ever so much more complex and ever so much
more swiftly moving and that these externalities
allegedly have diminished Congressional capacity.
First of all, it should be noted that some of
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these developments, like the so-called communi-
cations revolution, have benefitted the Congress.
The President will find it much easier nowadays
to convene the Congress on "extraordinary oc-
casions," if that becomes necessary, than in 1787.
The fact is that the Congress is nowadays practi-
cally in permanent session. Also, many of the
recent emergencies, for instance the Vietnam
War, did not exactly happen from one minute to
another. The balance of payments emergency
was in the making for many years. As concerns
any need to respond swiftly to developments on
foreign exchanges: does one really want to argue
that multinational corporations and oil sheiks
can amend the United States Constitution?
It is quite true that the Congress does not
presently have the bureaucratic capacities that
might be needed for careful evaluation of admin-
istration policies. That deficiency, however, most
certainly is remediable. In any event, the alleged
lack of information and understanding on the
part of the Congress is largely of the Presidents'
making. The executive concludes secret executive
agreements, invokes executive privilege for the
vastly expanded White House bureaucracy, im-
pounds funds from one day to another, and then
argues that the Congress would not know what to
do in an emergency. However, Presidents are
only partially responsible for this state of affairs.
If unfortunate and unwise, it is still natural that
they show no excessive concern for keeping the
Congress viable. Most of the responsibility for
the sad state of affairs lies with the Congress.
While kings, even presidents, may abdicate, Con-
gress has no constitutional right to do so. "Emer-
gency powers" are among the most serious dan-
gers to democracy. The duty of Congress to abate
the danger is clear. All that is doubtful is whether
the members of Congress have the will to abide
their constitutional oath of office.
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